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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - POST-SEPARATION SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE PRECLUDES ENFORCEMENT OF AGREE-
MENT REQUIRING PARTIES TO LIVE SEPARATE AND
APART - Higgins v. Higgins
INTRODUCTION
"There comes a time in some relationships when no matter how
sincere the attempt to reconcile the differences or how strong the
wish to re-create a part of the past once shared, the struggle be-
comes so painful that nothing else is felt and the world and all its
beauty only add to the discomfort by providing cruel contrast."1
Public policy in most states regards separation agreements as
acceptable contracts. 2 The parties to a separation agreement cove-
nant that they will live separate and apart.3 A century ago, such
agreements were not only disfavored by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, but vehemently rejected as being void and contrary
to public policy. 4 Separation agreements in North Carolina today
are both acceptable and legally binding.' Upon establishing the va-
lidity of a separation agreement, it becomes imperative to ascertain
those actions which will terminate the contract. Over the years, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has vacilated over the impact iso-
lated acts of sexual intercourse between husband and wife have on
an executed separation agreement.6
1. D. VIscoTT, How TO LIVE WITH ANOTHER PERSON 183 (1974).
2. 1 A. LINDEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CON-
TRACTS § 3.02, at 3-5 (1988) [hereinafter LINDEY]; 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAM-
ILY LAW § 188, at 467 (4th ed. 1980) [hereinafter LEE].
3. N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-6 (1987) (permits a couple to dissolve their marriage
and execute a divorce by application of either party when husband and wife have
lived separate and apart for one year); 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187 at 459.
4. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 153, 159 (1867).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1984) (any married couple is authorized to exe-
cute a separation agreement consistent with public policy and that agreement will
be both valid and binding); 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 188, at 466.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1987) (the 1987 amendment to this section states
that isolated acts of sexual intercourse shall not toll the statutory period for di-
vorce predicated on one year separation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.2 (Supp. 1988)
(resumption of marital relations is defined as a voluntary renewal between hus-
band and wife of the marriage as shown by the totality of circumstances. Isolated
acts of sexual intercourse between the couple shall not constitute a resumption of
1
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In Higgins v. Higgins7 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that an agreement written in 1983 requiring the transfer of prop-
erty if the husband and wife lived "separate and apart," was inval-
idated by their resumption of sexual relations.' The supreme court
in Higgins relied on the rule of law in Murphy v. Murphy9 to in-
terpret the legal meaning of the term "separate and apart."10 The
rule in Murphy stated that a married couple who executed a sepa-
ration agreement terminated the agreement by engaging in acts of
sexual intercourse during the separation period.1" The Higgins
Court failed, however, to properly articulate how the decision of
Murphy provided semantic meaning to the term "separate and
apart" when Murphy never contained such a provision. 2
This Note will identify how the majority in Higgins analyzed
prior case law to derive a legal definition for the term "separate
and apart." This Note will also serve as a caveat to the legal com-
munity. The Higgins decision resulted from the couple's failure to
abide by the terms of a condition precedent that had been inserted
into a property settlement provision of the separation agreement.
The decision should be confined to its narrow facts. The case does
however deserve close scrutiny. Application by subsequent courts
of the Higgins ruling as precedent for the proposition that isolated
acts of sexual intercourse destroy an entire separation agreement
would seriously undermine legislative enactments and wreak havoc
with regard to executed provisions of separation agreements.
THE CASE
Mr. and Mrs. Higgins married on March 10, 1979.13 The
couple entered into a legal separation agreement on December 13,
marital relations). These two statutes in effect invalidated the rule of law set forth
in Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N. C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978), which held contrary
to the general rule of law in the United States, that isolated acts of sexual inter-
course between husband and wife voided the separation agreement.
7. 321 N.C. 482, 364 S.E.2d 426 (1988).
8. Id. at 484, 364 S.E.2d at 428 (only the provision in the separation agree-
ment where Mrs. Higgins agreed to transfer her interest in the marital residence
to her husband was rendered unenforceable).
9. 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
10. 321 N.C. at 484, 364 S.E.2d at 428.
11. 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
12. 321 N.C. at 491, 364 S.E.2d at 432. (Whichard, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 482, 364 S.E.2d at 427.
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1983.1" The Agreement and Deed of Separation stipulated that the
property distribution was to be in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-20(d).1" Paragraph four of the agreement provided that after
the one year separation period, Mrs. Higgins would transfer her
interest in the marital residence over to Mr. Higgins if they lived
continuously "separate and apart" during that time."6 Mr. and
Mrs. Higgins mutually released their property rights and waived
all rights to equitable distribution.17 Mrs. Higgins moved from the
marital residence upon execution of the agreement.'
During the one year separation period, Mr. and Mrs. Higgins
engaged in sexual relations with each other on a number of differ-
ent occasions. 9 At the end of the separation period, Mr. Higgins
requested Mrs. Higgins to abide by the terms of the separation
agreement and transfer her interest in the marital residence over
to him.20 Upon her refusal to do so, Mr. Higgins brought an action
for declaratory judgment seeking her compliance with paragraph
14. Id.
15. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1987) (permits a couple before, during or
after marriage "by written agreement, duly executed and acknowledged in accor-
dance with the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-10 and 52-10.1, or by a written
agreement valid in the jurisdiction where executed," to provide for distribution of
their marital property in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable).
16. 321 N.C. 482-83, 364 S.E.2d at 427. The fourth paragraph provided that:
"It is agreed that the residence and lot located at 3207 Edgewater Drive, Greens-
boro, North Carolina, shall remain titled in the name of Larry N. Higgins and
JoAnne Higgins for a period of one year from the date of this agreement and it is
agreed that if the parties have lived continuously separate and apart for that
full period that in that event Mrs. Higgins shall transfer her interest in the resi-
dence and lot to Mr. Higgins as part of the property settlement as provided
herein. Mr. Higgins and Mrs. Higgins have agreed upon a division of all their
personal property and Mrs. Higgins agrees to remove all the personal property
that she shall be entitled to from the residence located at 3207 Edgewater Drive
within a reasonable time after the execution of this agreement." Id. (emphasis
added).
17. Id. at 483, 364 S.E.2d at 427.
18. Id.
19. 321 N.C. at 483, 364 S.E.2d 427-28. The parties attended car shows on
two separate occasions at which time they shared a hotel room for up to four days
in January and again in March 1984. In March of 1984, Mrs. Higgins accompanied
Mr. Higgins to the funeral of his brother at which point she spent two nights in
the same room with him at the home of his parents. Mr. and Mrs. Higgins also
engaged in sexual intercourse in February, 1984, when they took their daughter to
the circus and in March, 1984, when Mrs. Higgins accompanied Mr. Higgins to
the hospital.
20. 321 N.C. at 483, 364 S.E.2d at 427.
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four of the separation agreement.2 Mrs. Higgins responded by
bringing suit for absolute divorce and an equitable distribution of
the marital estate and other personal effects.22 The trial court con-
solidated both actions.23 Mrs. Higgins made a motion for summary
judgment.2" Testimony given by both parties to the action revealed
a sharp contrast in how they construed the meaning of the contract
language which required them to live continuously "separate and
apart. '25 The trial court granted Mrs. Higgins' motion and dis-
missed her husband's action to enforce the provisions of paragraph
four.26
The issue facing the North Carolina Court of Appeals was
"whether provision four was unambiguous, permitting the trial
court to grant summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of
the provision's enforceability, as a matter of law."'2 7 The court of
appeals upheld the decision of the trial court to dismiss Mrs. Hig-
gins' action.28 A divided Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals. 9 The majority held the spe-
cific provision of a property settlement agreement requiring the
parties to live continuously "separate and apart" was unambigu-
ous.3 0 Consequently, the executory provision of the separation
agreement providing for ownership of the marital residence was
breached by subsequent acts of sexual intercourse between Mr.
and Mrs. Higgins. 3'
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 321 N.C. at 483, 364 S.E.2d at 427. Mrs. Higgins contended that the re-
sumption of sexual relations between her and Mr. Higgins terminated her legal
obligation to transfer her interest in the marital residence and thus she was enti-
tled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
25. Id. at 491-92, 364 S.E.2d at 432-33 (Whichard, J., dissenting). Mrs. Hig-
gins testified that it was her impression that any sexual relations between she and
her husband would void their agreement. Mr. Higgins testified to the contrary
stating that it was his belief that engaging in sex with his wife had nothing to do
with her obligation to transfer her interest in the marital residence.
26. Id. at 484, 364 S.E.2d at 428.
27. 86 N.C. App. at 515, 358 S.E.2d at 554.
28. Id. at 518, 358 S.E.2d at 556.
29. 321 N.C. at 486, 364 S.E.2d at 429.
30. Id.
31. 321 N.C. at 485, 364 S.E.2d at 429.
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BACKGROUND
A. Separation Agreements
1. Definition
Simply put, a separation agreement is a contract between hus-
band and wife reflecting a mutual agreement to live separate and
apart.3 2 Typical provisions include arrangements for spousal sup-
port, child support, and custody.3 A separation agreement is a
postnuptial agreement.3 4 It can be divided into three types: first, a
property settlement agreement entered into for the purpose of ad-
justing property rights and interests with the intent of continued
marital relations; second, a true separation agreement which does
not contain a property settlement agreement; and third, a hybrid
agreement combining a separation agreement and a property set-
tlement agreement.3 5
2. Distinctions Between Separation Agreements and Prop-
erty Settlements
Legal distinctions exist between a separation agreement and a
property settlement agreement.36 These distinctions are often ob-
scured by a tendency to lump both types of agreements into one
document referred to as a separation agreement.37 A property set-
tlement agreement concerns solely the division of the property in-
terests of the parties to the contract.38 It defines who owns what.39
Provisions contained in a property settlement agreement include a
mutual release of claims as well as a timetable and method of
transferring titles and possession of property. ° A property settle-
ment agreement can be entered into before, during, or after mar-
riage."' Absent an express provision, there is no requirement that
32. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187, at 459.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 461.
35. Id.
36. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187, at 460; 1 Lindey, supra note 2, § 3.01, at 3-3.
37. Annotation, Reconciliation as Affecting Separation Agreement or De-
cree, 35 A.L.R. 2D 707, 711 (1954).
38. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187, at 460; 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation
§ 883 (1983).
39. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187, at 463.
40. Annotation, Reconciliation as Affecting Separation Agreement or De-
cree, 35 A.L.R. 2D 707, 712 (1954).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1987).
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the parties separate after the execution of the property settlement
agreement.2
A separation agreement exists only when the parties to the
contract have already separated or intend to effect a separation
immediately upon execution of the document.4 3 The act of living
separate and apart has been held the source of consideration for
separation agreements." To be binding in North Carolina, a sepa-
ration agreement must be in writing and properly acknowledged by
the parties to the agreement before a notary public or other certi-
fying official."
3. Interpretation of Separation Agreements
Separation agreements are contracts and therefore are subject
to the same general rules of interpretation as any other contract."6
Where the terms and conditions utilized in the separation agree-
ment are plain and explicit, the trial court will determine the legal
effect of the terms and enforce them as written by the parties.47
Provisions in separation agreements are independent of each
other.4 s As a result each provision can be defined as a distinct en-
tity from the other provisions in the contract. Words utilized in
the separation agreement must be accorded their common meaning
and usage where they can be reasonably applied to the subject ma-
ter of the agreement.49
A property settlement agreement is a contract containing cer-
tain terms and conditions.50 Once a contractual term has been in-
serted into the agreement and mutually accepted, the parties to
42. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187, at 460.
43. Id.
44. Note, Domestic Relations: Isolated Acts of Sexual Intercourse Void Sep-
aration Agreements: Murphy v. Murphy, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137 (1980)
[hereinafter Note, Domestic Relations].
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1984); 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 187, at 460.
46. See, e.g., Cator v. Cator, 70 N.C. App. 719, 321 S.E.2d 36 (1984) (because
a separation agreement is a contract, the court applied the same rules used to
interpret any other contract); Case v. Case, 73 N.C. App. 76, 325 S.E.2d 661
(1985) (a separation agreement is a contract and, as a result, its meaning will
ordinarily be determined by the same rules used to interpret any other contract);
24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 838 (1983).
47. Blount v. Blount, 72 N.C. App. 193, 195, 323 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984), disc.
rev. denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985).
48. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 198, at 509.
49. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 904 (1966).
50. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 883 (1966).
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the agreement must abide by it.5 1 It is acceptable contract lan-
guage for a property settlement agreement to require a couple to
live "separate and apart."52 Having inserted a stipulation to agree
to live "separate and apart" into the contract, Mr. and Mrs. Hig-
gins were bound by its legal meaning.5 3
B. Effects of a Resumption of Sexual Relations Between a
Married Couple with Respect to Separation Agreements
1. Murphy v. Murphy
In Murphy v. Murphy,54 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that, "sexual intercourse between a husband and wife after
the execution of a separation agreement avoids the contract. '6 5 Mr.
and Mrs. Murphy were married on May 23, 1958.5 They separated
on March 1, 1972 and executed a deed of separation three days
later.57 On August 8, 1973, Mr. Murphy instituted an action for
divorce based on the one year separation period. 8 Mrs. Murphy
counterclaimed alleging that the agreement had been rescinded be-
cause the couple had "reconciled" by engaging in sexual relations
with each other during the separation period. 9
The trial judge instructed the jury that for a husband and wife
to reconcile and renew marital relations, more was required than
"a mere reconciliation or making up of the parties, but it means
renewal and resumption of the marital relations, and this would
require something more than sexual intercourse alone." 0 The trial
judge also instructed the jury that, "the word cohabitation in our
law means something more than sexual intercourse between the
51. Williams v. McLean, 220 N.C. 504, 506, 17 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1941) (the
writing was held to be conclusive as to the terms of the bargain); Oliver v. Hecht,
207 N.C. 481, 486, 177 S.E. 399, 402 (1934) (when parties reduce their contract to
writing, they are presumed to have inserted in it all provisions by which they
intend to be bound); Ray v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 38 (1887); 2 LEE, supra note 2, §
198, at 508.
52. See generally 321 N.C. 482, 364 S.E.2d 426 (1988).
53. See supra note 51.
54. 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
55. Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
56. Id. at 390, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
57. Id. at 391, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
58. Id. at 390, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
59. Id. at 391, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
60. Id. at 394, 245 S.E.2d at 696.
1988]
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parties."'"
The instructions given were based on two previously decided
North Carolina Court of Appeals cases, Cooke v. Cooke 2 and
Newton v. Williams. 3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in
reaching those two decisions relied on a statement by Professor
Robert E. Lee in his treatise North Carolina Family Law which
stated that, "mere proof that isolated acts of sexual intercourse
have taken place between the parties is not conclusive evidence of
a reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation." ' Professor Lee
futher stated that in order to conclusively prove that there is a
resumption of cohabitation "[tihere must ordinarily appear that
the parties have established a home and that they are living in it in
the normal relationship of husband and wife." 5
The majority rule was expounded by Professor Lee and uti-
lized by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Cooke and
Newton.6 6 The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Murphy over-
turned the prior decisions of Cooke and Newton and held that
"sexual intercourse between a husband and wife after the execu-
tion of a separation agreement avoids the contract. 6 7 The termi-
nation of the contract occurred "whether the resumption of sexual
relations be casual, isolated, or otherwise." '68
2. State v. Gossett
The North Carolina Supreme Court based its holding in Mur-
phy on the case of State v. Gossett.9 In 1932, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in Gossett, stated that a separation agreement was
void when the couple engaged in sexual intercourse with each other
after the execution of a separation agreement. 7° The defendant,
61. Id.
62. 34 N.C. App. 124, 237 S.E.2d 323 (1977) (reconciliation required more
than casual acts of sexual intercourse and more than a hope for resumption of the
full marital relationship).
63. 25 N.C. App. 527, 214 S.E.2d 285 (1975) (the issue of the couple's mutual
intent is an essential element in deciding whether the parties were reconciled and
resumed cohabitation).
64. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 200, at 523.
65. Id.
66. 295 N.C. at 395, 245 S.E.2d at 697.
67. Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
68. Id.
69. 203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. at 754.
70. Id. at 644, 166 S.E. at 755.
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Mr. Gossett, had entered into a separation agreement with his
wife.71 After their separation, the defendant visited his wife on a
number of occasions, engaging in sexual intercourse with her each
time.71
The rationale behind the decision of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in Gossett was to prevent a separation agreement
from acting as a tool for Mr. Gossett to "escape the responsibilities
imposed by the marital status and yet be free to partake of such
privileges as he chose to enjoy."'73 The three foundations underly-
ing the decision in Gossett were: first, moral certitude; second, the
state's interest in marriage; and third, judicial efficiency.74
3. Separate and Apart as Defined in Murphy and Gossett
According to the decision of the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Gossett, the foundation of the separation agreement en-
tered into between Mr. and Mrs. Gossett was the declaration
"[a]nd do hereby agree to live separate and apart. 75 According to
the instructions given by the trial judge, "when a husband and wife
enter into a deed of separation the policy of the law is that they
are to live separate, and that they are not to keep up the sexual
relation and continue that, but that they are to live separate and
apart. '76
In Murphy, the North Carolina Supreme Court in its approval
of the rule in Gossett, held that "this court is still constrained to
hold that sexual intercourse between a husband and wife after the
execution of a separation agreement avoids the contract. ' 77 The
supreme court went on to state that "severance of marital relations
by a separation agreement and continued sexual intercourse be-
tween the parties 'are essentially antagonistic and irreconcilable
notions.' "78 According to the Murphy court, the term "separate
and apart" was inconsistant with a resumption of sexual relations,
isolated or otherwise, between a separated couple.
71. Id. at 642, 166 S.E. at 754.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 644, 166 S.E. at 755.
74. Note, Domestic Relations, supra note 44, at 144.
75. 203 N.C. at 643, 166 S.E. at 755.
76. Id.
77. 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
78. Id. (quoting 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL
CONTRACTS § 8-13 (1977)).
1988]
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C. Effects of a Resumption of Sexual Relations Between a
Married Couple with Respect to Property Settlements
1. Equitable Distribution Act
On October 1, 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly en-
acted the Equitable Distribution Act."9 One effect of the legislation
was to allow a couple to execute a property settlement agreement
at any time during marital relations.8 0 The public policy in North
Carolina prior to the passage of the Equitable Distribution Act was
to allow property settlement agreements to be entered into only in
those instances where the couple had separated previously or sepa-
rated immediately upon execution of the document."' The passage
of the Equitable Distribution Act and specifically the passage of
section 50-20(d), allowed a married couple to execute a binding
property settlement agreement without requiring that they sepa-
rate afterwards.82 Justice Whichard theorized in the Higgins deci-
sion, that the General Assembly may have passed section 50-20(d)
in response to the resounding criticism from the legal community
over the decision rendered in Murphy. 3
2. Buffington v. Buffington
Buffington v. Buffington 84 addressed the impact of section 50-
20(d) upon North Carolina public policy. Buffington involved a sit-
uation where the couple executed a separation agreement contain-
ing provisions for the distribution of their property. No language
in any of the provisions required the couple to live "separate and
apart." Following the execution of the agreement, the couple re-
mained living together at the marital residence for eighteen days. 5
The defendant, Mrs. Buffington, after failing to comply with the
terms of the separation agreement, contended that the agreement
was invalidated by her continued cohabitation with her husband
for the eighteen day period following the execution of the agree-
ment.88 The North Carolina Supreme Court in Buffington stated
79. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987)).
80. See Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
81. 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
82. Id.
83. 321 N.C. at 490, 364 S.E.2d at 432 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
84. 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
85. Id. at 484, 317 S.E.2d at 97.
86. Id. at 484, 317 S.E.2d at 98.
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that the defendant could not avoid her responsibilities under the
separation agreement simply because of her continued cohabita-
tion with her husband after the execution of the contract. 7
In Buffington, the Court addressed the issue of "whether the
passage of the Equitable Distribution Act, which permits property
settlements executed '[b]efore, during or after marriage,' alters our
state's former public policy, expressed in the prior decisional law
of this state which permitted such agreements only where the par-
ties had already separated or separated immediately after the exe-
cution of the agreement." 88 According to the Supreme Court, the
new public policy in North Carolina was to allow a married couple
to enter into a property settlement at any time.89 The Supreme
Court's decision resulted in a clear and unequivocal statement that
the public policy of the state of North Carolina allowed spouses to
execute a binding property settlement agreement at any time even
if the execution was not followed by separation between the
parties.
3. Love v. Mewborn
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Love v. Mewborn9° held
that a property settlement agreement executed before, during or
after marriage was not necessarily terminated by reconciliation.9
Mr. and Mrs. Mewborn entered into a separation agreement and
property settlement agreement whereby Mr. Mewborn agreed to
provide his wife with monthly alimony payments of $800.00 for a
ten year period.92 The property settlement agreement did not stip-
ulate that the parties were to live "separate and apart." The couple
engaged in a short reconciliation of less than twenty-four hours at
which time they engaged in sexual intercourse.93 Mr. Mewborn
stopped making payments to his wife following the period of rec-
onciliation. Mrs. Mewborn who had since remarried, brought an
action to recover unpaid payments up to the time of her
remarriage. 4
87. Id. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
88. Id. at 485, 317 S.E.2d at 98.
89. Id. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
90. 79 N.C. App. 465, 339 S.E.2d 487 (1986), disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 704,
347 S.E.2d 43 (1986).
91. 79 N.C. App. at 466, 339 S.E.2d at 488.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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In Love, the North Carolina Supreme Court cited Buffington
along with section 50-20(d) as precedent for its decision.9 5 The use
of Buffington however was somewhat controverted. The decision in
Buffington never mentioned the effects of reconciliation, instead it
held that "the public policy of our state, as expressed by G.S. § 50-
20(d), permits spouses to execute a property settlement at any
time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter
or not. 98
ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Higgins had to inter-
pret the legal meaning of the term "separate and apart." 91 Distri-
bution of the real property described in paragraph four of the
property settlement agreement was contingent upon the condition
that the parties were to live "separate and apart" for a one year
period. The North Carolina Supreme Court in Higgins determined
that previous case law had defined the term "separate and
apart."9 8 The definition in Murphy, which the Higgins court relied
upon, stated that sexual relations between husband and wife were
inconsistent with living "separate and apart".9 9 Mr. and Mrs. Hig-
gins had engaged in sexual relations with each other during the
separation period. 100 As a result, the trial court held that provision
which required the transfer of real property upon the condition
that the parties lived continuously "separate and apart" to have
been invalidated.10 '
A. Separate and Apart Defined
The most forceful argument the dissent made against the use
of Murphy by the majority was the fact that Murphy never gave
semantic meaning to the term "separate and apart."102 The major-
ity in Higgins did fail to articulate how Murphy attached a legal
meaning to the term "separate and apart" when the term was
never explicitly defined by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
95. Id.
96. 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
97. 321 N.C. at 484, 364 S.E.2d at 428.
98. Id.
99. 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
100. See supra note 19.
101. 321 N.C. at 485, 364 S.E.2d at 428.
102. Id. at 491, 364 S.E.2d at 432 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
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that decision. However, the assumption by the dissent that the
Murphy decision did not attach a meaning to the term is incorrect.
Murphy involved a situation where the couple executed a
valid separation agreement." 3 Separation agreements by their very
nature require the parties to the contract to live "separate and
apart" during the separation period in order to be effective.104 Rec-
onciliation between the parties voids a separation agreement."°5
Murphy adopted the rule in Gossett.00 Whether such an
adoption was either wise or laudable is insignificant. The decision
of the Murphy court to reach back eighty years to adopt the rule
in Gossett signaled the legal community that reconciliation in
North Carolina could be effected either by cohabitation or a re-
sumption of sexual relations.107 Gossett explicitly defined "sepa-
rate and apart" and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Murphy
adopted that definition. Therefore, Murphy clearly stood for the
proposition that living "separate and apart" was inconsistent with
a resumption of sexual relations between parties to a separation
agreement.
When Mr. and Mrs. Higgins executed their separation agree-
ment, the language "separate and apart" had a clear legal defini-
tion.10 8 Mr. and Mrs. Higgins engaged in sexual intercourse with
each other on several occasions during the separation period.109
Since the legal term of art stipulated that "sex" and "separate"
were not bedfellows, the majority had no choice but to find the
actions of Mr. and Mrs. Higgins in violation of the condition prece-
dent to the contract.
The dissent focused great attention to the fact that Mr. and
Mrs. Higgins had attached different meanings to the term "sepa-
rate and apart."110 This onslaught over the apparent ambiguity of
the term was unnecessary and impractical. The dissenting justices
were overzealous in their desire to convince the rest of the supreme
court that the interpretation the parties attached to the term "sep-
103. 295 N.C. at 391, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
104. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1987).
105. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 200, at 514; 1 LINDEY, supra note 2, § 9.05, at 9-
10.
106. 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
107. See generally, Note, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support,
Private Agreements and the State, 59 N.C.L. REV. 819, 842 (1981).
108. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
109. 86 N.C. App. at 515, 358 S.E.2d at 554.
110. 321 N.C. at 488-931, 364 S.E.2d at 430-33.
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arate and apart" was more important than its legal definition.
The majority in Higgins did not concern themselves with how
Mr. and Mrs. Higgins construed the meaning of "separate and
apart" since no ambiguity existed in that term. Murphy defined as
a matter of law what it meant to live continuously "separate and
apart."'11 When the terms of a contract are plain and explicit the
courts will determine the legal effect of that term and enforce it as
written by the parties." 2
B. Higgins and the Equitable Distribution Act
The use of Buffington v. Buffington and Love v. Mewborn by
the dissent as support for their contention that sexual acts be-
tween a married couple do not void a provision requiring the
couple to live "separate and apart," was inappropriate. The recog-
nition and lengthy discussion Justice Webb gave assuring the dis-
sent that the majority opinion was consistent with section 50-20(d)
as well as Buffington and Love was purely gratuitous. Recognition
of those cases by the dissent was unfounded given the inappropri-
ateness of their use as controlling law.
Neither Love nor Buffington used the contractual terminology
"separate and apart" in their property settlement agreements. Had
those cases contained that condition precedent and both courts
still reached the same outcome, the dissent would have had a hook
upon which to hang its hat. Since both cases were drafted in a dis-
similar manner from the property settlement agreement in Hig-
gins, there can hardly be a logical comparison drawn between
those cases and Higgins.
The reliance by Mr. Higgins on the North Carolina Supreme
Court decision in Love as controlling law was tenuous. The deci-
sion in Love stated that a property settlement agreement executed
before, during or after marriage was not necessarily terminated by
reconciliation.11 3 In that decision, the North Carolina Supreme
Court cited Buffington as precedent for its position." 4 However,
the use of Buffington in the rationale was seriously flawed. The
Buffington court never mentioned the effects of reconciliation but
rather discussed whether a couple had to separate after executing a
111. See supra notes 72 and 78 and accompanying text.
112. 2 LEE, supra note 2, § 198, at 511.
113. 79 N.C. App. at 466, 339 S.E.2d at 488.
114. Id.
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property settlement agreement. 5 The impact of Love then as sub-
stantive case law in support of Mr. Higgins' contentions is weak
given the lack of support for its own conclusions.
C. Impact of Higgins
The ultimate impact of the Higgins decision was to demon-
strate the effect of a condition precedent that had been inserted
into an executory provision of a separation agreement, prior to the
passage of section 50-10.2, which required the parties to live "sepa-
rate and apart." Legislative enactments by the North Carolina
General Assembly presently allow a property settlement agreement
to be entered into without being terminated by subsequent acts of
sexual intercourse.116 The impact of Higgins is minimal given the
subsequent enactment of section 52-10.2 which states that,
"[r]esumption of marital relations shall be defined as a voluntary
renewal of the husband and wife relationship, as shown by the to-
tality of the circumstances. Isolated incidents of sexual intercourse
between the parties shall not constitute a resumption of marital
relations.' '1
Justice Webb in delivering the opinion in Higgins stated that
the North Carolina Supreme Court was "advertent to section 52-
10.2 which overrules Murphy and Love." 8 Justice Webb went on
to state that since the enactment of section 52-10.2 did not take
effect until October 1, 1987, it did not factor into the resolution of
the case." 9 The rule set forth in Murphy that sexual intercourse
voids a separation agreement continues to rest in the grave dug for
it by the legislative enactment of section 52-10.2.120
D. Practice after Higgins
If a married couple wishes to enter into a property settlement
agreement and not have it or one of its provisions rendered void by
subsequent acts of sexual intercourse, they need do nothing more
than leave all language requiring them to live "separate and apart"
out of the contract. A couple who wishes to execute a property set-
tlement agreement and maintain sexual relations can certainly do
115. 69 N.C. App. at 485, 317 S.E.2d at 98.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1987).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10.2 (Supp. 1987).
118. 321 N.C. at 486, 364 S.E.2d at 429.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 6.
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so under authority of section 50-20(d). 21 However in light of sec-
tion 50-10.2 even if the couple were to include the language "sepa-
rate and apart" in an executory provision of a separation agree-
ment, as a condition precedent to the transfer of marital property,
they could do so and continue to engage in acts of sexual inter-
course.22 According to the language of section 50-10.2, isolated in-
cidents of sexual relations are not alone sufficient enough to de-
stroy the contract.1 23
Caution should however be exercised by any attorney who
might be inclined to insert a condition that the parties live "sepa-
rate and apart" into an executory provision of a separation agree-
ment. The courts in North Carolina have yet to decide the defini-
tion of the term "isolated incidents." To preclude a court from
later interpreting a resumption of sexual relations between the
couple as a reconciliation, it would be wise to counsel a separated
couple on the possible effects that a resumption of sexual relations
might entail. Prudence would dictate that absent any express de-
sire to reconcile, the couple should refrain from sexual contact be-
tween themselves.
The language of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the ma-
jority opinion of Higgins seems to allude to the fact that the case
would have been resolved differently had the separation agreement
been drafted after October 1, 1987, the effective date of section 50-
10.2.124 If the North Carolina Supreme Court had been faced with
appellate review of a situation identical to that in Higgins, but in
which the contract had been entered into subsequent to October 1,
1987, the supreme court would have been statutorily bound separa-
tion to hold paragraph four of the separation agreement valid de-
spite a resumption of sexual relations between the parties to the
contract.
It would seem both illogical and absurd for the North Carolina
Supreme Court to step back and resurrect the rule in Murphy
when no clear need exists. The rule of Murphy was adopted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Higgins in order to provide se-
mantic meaning to the term "separate and apart" in light of the
resumption of sexual relations between the separated couple.
Given that an applicable statute, section 50-10.2, states that a re-
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1987).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10.2) (Supp. 1987).
123. Id.
124. 321 N.C. at 486, 364 S.E.2d at 429.
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sumption of sexual relations does not constitute marital reconcilia-
tion, there is no reason today to dredge up the rule in Murphy.
The manner in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
reached its legal conclusion in Higgins was sound, as was the
Court's ultimate decision. To have decided the case in the same
manner when the contract had been enacted subsequent to Octo-
ber 1, 1987 would have been incorrect. After October 1, 1987, a
situation similar to that in Higgins would fall under the legislative
enactment of section 50-10.2. Any outcome similar to that of the
Higgins decision would be legally unsound in the face of control-
ling statutes and would effect a revival of the rule in Murphy.
CONCLUSION
In holding that a provision in a property settlement agreement
which required the parties to live "separate and apart" was voided
by a resumption of sexual relations, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Higgins simply applied the legal meaning to the term of
the provision which had to be fulfilled before the contract could be
carried out. The decision in Higgins did not act to resurrect the
rule in Murphy. Provisions in separation agreements are indepen-
dent of each other. A revitalization of the rule in Murphy would
have resulted in the court holding the entire separation agreement
void because the couple resumed sexual relations.
The law regarding the effect of subsequent sexual relations in
regard to an executed property settlement agreement has been de-
cided by virtue of section 50-10.2. A property settlement agree-
ment can be executed before, during or after marriage without be-
ing destroyed as a result of a resumption of sexual relations
between the parties.
Attorneys and future courts must exercise care in ensuring
that the holding of Higgins is not given more credence than it de-
serves. The conclusion reached by the supreme court would be le-
gally unsound if applied to separation agreements enacted after
October 1, 1987. After the enactment of section 50-10.2 parties to a
contract requiring them to live "separate and apart" can resume
sexual relations and still live "separate and apart."
Gerald H. Groon, Jr.
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